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There is a paradox in Japan's external trade. Merchandise exports and imports 
have been less than 10% of gross domestic product (GDP) in the late 1980s1 - the 
lowest among the group of seven (G7) countries (except for the United States)2 - and 
yet when one turns to individual commodities, one finds Japan's dependence on foreign 
trade to be the highest among these countries on both the export and import sides. 
For instance, in 1987, 82% of watches and clocks, 64% of VTRs, and 57% of passenger 
cars produced in Japan were exported,3 and 100% of crude petroleum and iron ore and 
86% of wheat consumed in Japan were imported. 
The paradox arises from the structure of Japan's international trade, that is, from 
its high dependence on a few major commodities on both the export and import sides. 
This structure implies that, should, for some reason, Japan's exports and/or imports be 
severely disrupted, the Japanese economy would be thrown into an economic chaos of 
formidable magnitude. Such was the case with the first oil shock of 1973-74. As the 
price of petroleum quadrupled, Japan's trade went into a deficit and its economy was 
thrown into a heavy recession coupled with a high inflation. On the other hand, when 
the terms of trade turn in favor of Japan, the economy enjoys a boom with stable 
prices as in the latest boom which began at the end of 1986. Japan's growth and 
inflation are quite sensitive to external economic conditions despite its low aggregate 
dependence on the foreign sector. 
Though Japan's dependence on other countries is high for both exports and 
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imports, this article is limited to a review of Japan's import dependence for resource 
goods, namely, foods, fuels, and crude materials.4 The next section of the article 
reviews the deepening of Japan's dependence on resource imports, section 3 examines 
the supply side and the demand side of resource imports, and section 4 considers the 
possibility of structural change of the Japanese economy. 
2. Japan's dependence on resource imports 
The fatal weakness of Japan as an economy is in its poor resource endowments. 
For instance, it has no reserves of petroleum in its land and the whole of petroleum it 
consumes has to be imported. In fact, the lack of petroleum, if nothing else, doomed 
Japan's military pursuits in World War II. The situation became worse after World 
War II as Japan lost its overseas territories that supplied raw materials. As the 
economy recovered and started to grow in the 1950s, the need for resources expanded. 
As exports were limited, it was necessary to place imports under strict government 
control. Imports of primary goods were given priority in foreign exchange allocation. 
Imports of nonessential goods such as consumer goods were discouraged. This bias still 
lingers in Japan's import structure. 
As the Japanese economy kept up its growth and Japan's exports became 
internationally competitive, the balance-of-payments constraint was gradually relaxed 
and imports were allowed more freedom. As resource imports were liberalized, their 
share of total resource supplies continued to increase. In the case of farm products, 
agricultural policy was in a somewhat schizophrenic state. On the one hand, the rapid 
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growth of the 1960s required a massive relocation of workers from agriculture to 
industry. To offset the resulting contraction of farm output, it became necessary to 
increase food imports. On the other hand, the government wanted to protect the 
economic interest of farmers (who were the staunch supporters of the ruling political 
party) through income maintenance and price support. For this purpose, the 
government placed import restrictions on many agricultural products. Agriculture was 
far more protected in Japan than elsewhere in the world.5 These restrictions (except 
for rice) have been gradually relaxed, however. 
See Table 1 for changes in the self-sufficiency ratio (the ratio of domestic output 
to total supplies) for a number of primary goods from 1960 to 1987. A few different 
patterns of change are observed in the self-sufficiency ratios of agricultural and fishing 
products. Rice, vegetables, and fish remained highly self-sufficient throughout the 
period under review. Fruits, meat, and milk and dairy products witnessed a slow 
decline from full self-sufficiency. Wheat and pulse (including soybeans) were less self-
sufficient to begin with and became even less so over time. Exceptions are sugar and 
oils and fats, whose dependence on imports remained relatively high but fell over time 
in recent years. 
In interpreting data of this table, however, one must take care because a high 
self-sufficiency ratio may be the result of agricultural protection (as in the case of rice, 
fruits, meat, and milk and dairy products). Rice remains self-sufficient because of the 
continuing protection of rice on both production and distribution that was instituted 
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during World War II for the sake of food security. The need for the control remained 
after World War II because of the supply shortage. But soon rice production 
recovered, while rice consumption has been steadily falling.6 Thus, the need for rice 
control disappeared a long time ago. Nonetheless, the government still refuses to 
decontrol rice. The consequence is a persistent overproduction as the official price of 
rice has been kept high. The true intention of the government is no longer food 
security but providing special favors to rice farmers who have been staunch supporters 
of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party. 
The United States is the largest exporter of rice, and among foreign strains of 
rice the rice produced in the southern U.S. is the closest to sticky Japanese rice. Thus 
the U.S. wants Japan to open its domestic rice market to American rice but Japan 
adamantly refuses to comply. Rice has been one of the unresolved trade issues 
between the U.S. and Japan.7 
The Engel coefficient (food expenditure divided by total consumption 
expenditure) has been falling - from 41.6% in 1960 to 25.5% in 1988. Excluding rice, 
the fall has been more modest ~ from 31.2% to 23.7%. As the standard of living has 
been rising, the real value of food consumption (other than rice) has been increasing. 
In this process, Japanese diets have become richer and more Westernized. For 
instance, the annual consumption of milk doubled from 49 liters in 1960 to 108 liters in 
1988 per household. 
Westernization of Japanese diets has increased protein intake. But self-
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sufficiency has fallen only moderately for meat and milk and dairy products? Though 
one may be tempted to attribute the fall to the quota restrictions on these products,8 
the fact is that meat is produced at home by feeding grains that are imported. Thus, 
when one eats domestically produced meat, one is in fact consuming imported feed 
grains. For that matter, the high degree of self-sufficiency in fish is also illusory 
because the Japanese fishing fleet must depend on imported petroleum to go on its 
long-distance fishing expeditions. 
As consumers turned from rice to bread, wheat imports rose. Soybeans, the raw 
material for Japan's daily necessities ~ tofu, soy sauce, and miso condiments -- are 
nowadays imported mostly from the U.S. Japanese soybeans, even though superior in 
quality, could not compete in price with imported soybeans. 
Japan was nearly self-sufficient in lumber in the 1960s, but nearly two-thirds of 
its lumber was imported in the 1970s and the 1980s - such as pinewood from the 
Northwest of the U.S. and lauan wood from the Philippines. Japanese houses are now 
built with imported lumber.9 
In terms of fuel calories, as shown by figures for 1987, Japan's primary energy is 
supplied nearly 80% (in 1987) by coal (18.0%) and petroleum (59.8%). Imports 
accounted for 89.4% of the coal and 99.7% of the petroleum.10 Coal was once 
indigenously supplied but domestic coal mines could not compete with foreign supplies 
and most of them were phased out. Thus Japan's energy supply is mostly (82% in 
1987) imported. 
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For mineral ores, the story is more or less the same. Iron and copper ores are 
almost wholly imported. Supplies of lead, zinc, tungsten, and other ores are a little 
better but they have become increasingly more import-dependent. 
Until the first oil shock, Japan grew even more rapidly than other countries and 
its imports expanded even faster. Thus Japan's resource imports came to command an 
increasing share of world imports of resource goods as seen in Table 2. Since then, 
Japan's imports of crude materials and mineral fuels have slowed down. Thus, their 
shares of world imports reached a peak in 1970 for crude materials (SITC 2+4) and in 
the mid-1970s for mineral fuels (SITC 3). 
At the three-digit SITC level, Japan's shares of world imports of primary goods 
is often very high. As shown in Table 3, Japan ranked first in 20 SITC three-digit 
categories, second in 6 categories, and third in 11 categories. Japan's world-market 
share is extremely high in several categories, commanding more than one-quarter of 
world imports.11 Even when Japan is not the top importer, the concentration of 
imports is so marked that Japan's demand when combined with that of other top 
importers can exert a profound influence on the world market, as is the case with crude 
petroleum.12 
This sort of market domination may give rise to serious international friction 
when Japan's tastes significantly differ from Western tastes. The best current example 
of this nature is Japan's imports of African elephant tusks. Ivorv has been a 
commodity in strong demand in Japan for making personal seals, mah jong sets, 
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personal accessories, and various objects d'art, Even though trade in ivory was illegal in 
Africa, smuggling went on. Japan ivory imports were legal insofar as they came 
through a third country. Thus, in 1987, some 130 tons of ivory were legally imported 
into Japan, mostly via Hong Kong, accounting for about 40% of world ivory output.13 
Ivory is the most flagrant but not the only case of this nature.14 
3. The Supply Side and the Demand Side 
Resource imports are both a cause and an effect of macroeconomic activity. 
They are sensitive to supply shocks and demand shocks. Supply shocks, which originate 
overseas, became notable in the 1970s, especially during the two oil crises of 1973-74 
and 1979-80. They significantly affect the country's growth and inflation. Demand 
shocks originate in Japan, and influence the economies of materials-supplying countries. 
A. The supply side. A supply shock occurs when the supply curve of a 
commodity shifts abruptly due to natural or artificial causes. There have seldom been 
absolute restrictions on quantities supplied, however.15 The oil shock of 1973-74 created 
havoc in Japan because the Japanese mistook the action of the OPEC for a quantity 
restriction rather than a sharp price increase. Nonetheless, it is true that the more 
dependent an economy is on resource imports, the more vulnerable it becomes to an 
adverse supply shock. When a country depends virtually wholly on imported key 
materials, it can become an economic hostage of supplying countries. Resource imports 
then are an Achilles' heel for such a country. For a country to safeguard against such 
vulnerability, it must prepare for the contingency. There are a number of alternative 
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ways to do this. 
The first is to produce the material at home regardless of the costs that involves. 
The best example of this is rice. Rice production continues to be protected in Japan 
despite its extremely high costs, and the reason for this protection is allegedly food 
security. 
The second alternative is to enter into a long-term contract with a principal 
supplier. This arrangement, however, is difficult to maintain in a real world where the 
market price of the commodity tends to fluctuate a great deal. 
The third alternative is to invest overseas for resource development. Japan did 
so in developing petroleum resources in Indonesia and the Middle East. This line of 
action, however, encounters strong resistance from host countries under resource 
nationalism. Further, when the host country is politically unstable, the political risk can 
be considerable.16 In earlier years through the 1960s, resource development took a 
lion's share of Japan's overseas direct investment. Since then, its share has been 
steadily falling.17 
The fourth alternative is to promote technological innovations toward materials 
saving at home. When the price of a material, for instance, petroleum, is raised, firms 
that use that material as an intermediate input would reduce the use of the material 
under a given technology. This is what economic theory calls the substitution effect. 
When, however, the price increase is large and is anticipated to be permanent, firms 
would respond in a more fundamental manner by altering technology itself so as to 
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decrease their dependence on the material. The same response occurs also among 
consumers when the material is consumed directly by households. What followed the 
oil shock of 1973-74 in Japan's efforts at energy conservation is a case in point. Until 
then, the demand for petroleum remained quite high, as reflected in the shift of power 
generation from hydraulic to thermal sources, the spread of motorization, and the 
expansion of petrochemical industries. Then came the oil shock which raised the 
petroleum price fourfold. It was thus high time that energy conservation should be 
attempted. In fact, the income elasticity of demand for petroleum fell from 1.44 for the 
years 1965-73 to 0.53 for the years 1974-88 according to my calculation.18 
B. The demand side. There are two aspects on the demand side ~ cyclical and 
structural. The cyclical aspect is concerned with the short-term transmission of Japan's 
business fluctuations to supplier countries. The structural aspect is concerned with long-
term imbalances in trade with Japan's trade partners. What follows concentrates on the 
structural aspect. 
The structural imbalances originate in Japan's trade structure of importing raw 
materials and exporting manufactured goods. Japan's exports are sold more to 
industrial countries and Japan's imports are purchased more from resource suppliers. 
Thus, even if merchandise trade is in balance as a whole, Japan's bilateral trade 
balance tends to be in surplus with industrial countries and in deficit with resource 
suppliers. This structure makes trade frictions inevitable because frictions are bilateral 
in nature. When Japan's global trade balance is in a huge surplus as it was in the 
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1980s, Japan tends to maintain trade surpluses with almost all trade partners. In 
particular, Japan's bilateral trade surplus has been the largest with the U.S.. While the 
U.S. remains the largest importer of Japanese goods, its exports to Japan are 
dominated by primary goods.19 Since Japan's primary imports have been sluggish, 
Japan's trade surplus with the U.S. continued to rise through the 1980s despite the high 
value of the yen in the late 1980s. It is therefore obvious why trade frictions escalated 
between the U.S. and Japan in the late 1980s. 
As Japan's trade surplus expanded globally, a new dimension was added in 
international tension in the sphere of Japan's overseas investment. As the current-
account surplus was invested in foreign assets, Japan became the largest net creditor in 
the world in the late 1980s while the U.S. became the largest net debtor. 
In this scheme, the terms of trade, that is, the relative prices of resources 
imported, play a key role. As the international prices of resource goods fell 
substantially in the late 1980s, Japan needed to pay less for imports at any given 
exchange rate. In a balance-of-payments equilibrium, net exports (exports less imports) 
are equated to net capital outflows. Imagine that capital flows are insensitive to the 
exchange rate. Then, when imports become cheaper, the yen has to appreciate in 
order to reduce net exports to the given level of net capital outflows. The appreciation 
of the yen makes imports even cheaper (in yen). As the input prices are thus lowered, 
the upward pressure on export prices is reduced. The reduction in Japan's exports is 
thereby checked. Trade frictions tend to be exacerbated when primary prices become 
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lower. Thus the recent rise in trade frictions, especially with the U.S., can be attributed 
in large measure to the cheapening of primary goods. 
To de-escalate trade frictions, it is essential to alter Japan's trade structure in a 
fundamental manner, especially bringing in a shift from resource imports to imports of 
manufactured goods. Would such a shift be possible? We examine this critical issue in 
the last section. 
4. Possibility of structural change. As is well-known, the trade structure is 
significantly different in Japan from that elsewhere. This feature is made clear in Table 
4 which shows the proportion of trade in primary goods (SITC 0-4) in total trade for 
exports and imports for the G7 countries. Primary goods are almost nil in Japan's 
exports while the proportion ranges between 10 and 35% in the exports of the other six 
countries. On the import side, primary goods account for as much as 60% in Japan, far 
above the proportion found for the other six countries. Not only do manufactured 
goods constitute a small fraction of Japan's imports but they are also mostly resource-
based goods. This lopsided trade structure was not of much international concern while 
Japan was a small country. Now that Japan is a large country, it matters a good deal. 
A basic change is clearly evident in Japan's import structure, marking the first oil 
crisis as the turning point. The change manifests itself in substantial reductions in the 
income elasticity of demand for crude materials and for mineral fuels20 as reported in 
Table 5. As for the former, it can be explained by a shift from unprocessed to semi-
processed products (which are included in manufactured goods in Table 5). This shift, 
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however, is not likely to have altered Japan's bilateral trade balances with primary-
exporting countries because it is they who shift production more toward semi-processed 
forms. To make a difference in this regard then, it is essential to effect a shift in 
Japan's imports toward finished manufactured goods. 
Table 6 shows changes in the commodity composition of Japan's imports. Mi 
covers food, fuels, and crude materials including semi-processed goods such as 
chemicals, metals, and textiles, M2 finished manufactured goods, and M3 goods not 
elsewhere classified. A significant change came about in the late 1980s. Mx declined 
substantially and M2 increased considerably as a fraction of total imports. The increase 
in M2 is particularly notable with respect to consumer goods. The capital goods 
imported are those that Japan is ill-adapted to produce, and in this respect they are 
like the crude material and chemicals that Japan has to import. They are complements 
to home production. Thus, if Japan's imports of finished manufactured goods are to be 
expanded, they must concentrate on consumer goods. 
At the moment, consumer good imports are divided equally between nondurable 
and durable goods. Two-thirds of imported nondurable consumer goods are textile 
products, mainly supplied by developing countries. Of durable consumer goods 
imported into Japan in 1988, 25% were passenger cars, 12% toys and musical 
instruments, 9% home electronics, and 4% home appliances. Those goods are supplied 
mostly by industrial countries. The fairly rapid expansion of imports of consumer 
goods, both durable and nondurable, since 1985 is often alleged to be prima facie 
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evidence that Japan's home markets have finally been made open. This interpretation, 
however, is false. Japan's import demand is price inelastic in general except for 
consumer goods. When the terms of trade turned against primary goods, Japan's 
import bill became smaller (relative to its gross domestic product). As the yen 
appreciated, imported consumer goods became cheaper; as the demand for them was 
price elastic,21 imports of consumer goods did not decline as much as imports of other 
goods. This is the main reason why imports of consumer goods expanded their share of 
total imports in the late 1980s. The expansion is thus the result of the price effect 
rather than the evidence of improved market access. 
It is true that the income elasticity of import demand is quite high for both 
capital goods and consumer goods.22 Therefore, given enough time, imports of finished 
manufactured goods will be expanded in relation to domestic output. But the process 
seems to be quite slow. Efforts to restructure Japan's imports have to be redoubled. 
There are, however, two serious impediments in this regard. 
First, increases in consumer good imports may be unevenly distributed over 
suppliers. Nondurable consumer goods like textiles are low-class goods originating in 
developing countries (very often produced by Japanese subsidiaries therein). Durable 
consumer goods are high-class goods supplied mainly from industrial countries. For the 
latter, Japanese tastes prefer more elegant European goods than plebeian American 
goods. The U.S. performs poorly as an exporter of finished consumer goods to Japan. 
Second, insofar as Japan must continue to export manufactured goods, a certain 
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quantity of imports must be in the form of crude materials or semi-processed goods. 
Further, foods and petroleum, whether in raw or semi-processed forms, must continue 
to be imported in a substantial amount. These import requirements impose an upper 
bound on the quantity of finished manufactured goods Japan will import. 
We have seen that Japan's high dependence on resource imports has given rise 
to international friction as Japan's economic size continues to grow vis-a-vis that of 
other countries. This dependence is not to disappear even when a structural change is 
effected. How to integrate Japan into the world's economic community under these 
circumstances is a challenge not only to Japan but also to the world. The protectionist 
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